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Abstract. We find that the magnitude of unique credit default swap (CDS) market 
information (constructed to be orthogonal to contemporaneous and lagged stock returns) 
declined after recent reforms that increased the level of post-trade regulatory and market 
transparency for CDSs. Around the same reforms, the ability of this CDS-unique information 
to predict future stock returns decreased. These results suggest the CDS market has become 
less of a “hidden” trading venue for informed investors since central clearing and trade 
reporting started.   
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1.  Introduction 
Prior to the global financial crisis (GFC), the credit default swap (CDS) market was 
considered an opaque, over-the-counter (OTC) market, in part because transaction-level data 
were not easily available to regulators and participants. In the aftermath of the GFC, several 
changes were introduced in the CDS market. In September 2009, the G20 leaders called for 
global improvements in the transparency and regulatory oversight of OTC derivatives via a 
move towards central clearing and trade reporting to repositories. In July 2010, the US 
Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) 
that, in its Title VII, mandates central counterparty (CCP) clearing, post-execution trade 
reporting to a swap data repository (SDR), SDR provision of data to regulators, and insider-
trading prohibition for several eligible OTC derivatives, including CDSs. Under the DFA, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is responsible for determining the specific rules 
for eligible single-name CDSs to be cleared via a CCP and reported mandatorily to an SDR.
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However, even before the passage of the DFA in 2010 and the SEC’s approval of relevant 
rules in 2015 and 2016, the CDS market structure was already undergoing important changes, 
triggered by the GFC events. In October 2008, a single repository, the Depository Trust & 
Clearing Corporation (DTCC), began: (i) registering CDS trades; (ii) making data reported by 
traders under a voluntary reporting regime available to the SEC and other relevant authorities; 
and (iii) publishing weekly aggregate transaction and position data for top single-name CDSs. 
In December 2009, Intercontinental Exchange Clear Credit (ICECC) began its voluntary 
central clearing service for North American single-name CDSs and public dissemination of 
daily volumes and the number of trades of its clearing activities.
2
 Altogether, 159 reference 
                                                          
1 As additional evidence of regulators’ increasing attention towards the CDS market, in May 2009 the SEC filed the first 
insider trading case involving CDSs. Information about this insider trading case is available at the SEC link: 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-102.htm. 
2 When a CDS position between two counterparties that are members of ICECC is submitted for clearing, the original 
contract is extinguished and replaced by two new contracts where ICECC acts as the counterparty to the original buyer and 
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entities began central clearing on ICECC at various points up to the end of 2013. This central 
clearing activity has increased the level of transparency in the CDS market.  
In this paper, we focus on the impact of these changes on informed trading in the CDS 
market. The stock price and CDS premium of a firm are exposed to the same fundamental 
shocks to its future cash flows. However, because of the differences in market structure and 
the presence of market frictions, informed investors may choose to trade in only one of these 
two securities, which would lead to earlier price discovery in the market chosen as the venue 
for informed trading.  
A number of papers study the lead-lag linkage between the CDS and stock markets. Acharya 
and Johnson (2007) find that changes in CDS premium negatively predict stock returns for a 
sample of 79 US firms during the pre-GFC period, from January 2001 to October 2004. 
Furthermore, they show that the intensity of the CDS-to-stocks information flow is stronger if 
the firm has experienced credit events and has a greater number of banking relationships. The 
authors interpret this evidence in favor of insider trading in the CDS market by banks that 
exploit their private information obtained from lending relationships. Qiu and Yu (2012) 
confirm the Acharya and Johnson (2007) results and show that the CDS-to-stocks information 
flow is stronger when the existing number of dealers providing quotes (proxying for the 
degree of asymmetric information) is larger. A CDS dealer with more information is more 
likely to offer quotes to others, as better information allows them to set the quotes correctly 
without fearing being “picked off” by other informed traders. These two studies on CDS price 
informativeness use data prior to the GFC.
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
seller. As a result, the creditworthiness and liquidity of ICECC are substituted for those of the original counterparties. Given 
its prominent role, in July 2011, ICECC came under the regulation and supervision of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) and the SEC. On 18 July 2012, the Financial Stability Oversight Council designated ICECC as a 





In this paper, we test whether the introduction of central clearing and reporting of CDS trades 
have changed the level of informativeness of CDS prices. We follow Acharya and Johnson 
(2007) in estimating the “CDS innovation,” which represents CDS-unique information 
orthogonal to contemporaneous and lagged stock returns by construction. First, to be sure that 
the estimated CDS innovations actually represent information rather than just illiquidity and 
noise, we show that they can be used to predict future stock returns. In particular, we see that 
positive CDS innovations, which reflect firm-specific bad news, can predict future stock 
returns in the proximity of credit events, but their predictability fell after the DTCC reporting 
began and central clearing started for the cleared reference entities. Second, by performing 
panel data regressions with DTCC and central clearing event dummies, we find that the 
magnitude of unique information incorporated in positive CDS innovations fell significantly 
around these events as well. Our results therefore suggest an unintended consequence of 
mandating greater transparency in the CDS market – it can push informed traders away from 
the CDS market and reduce its price discovery role and contribution to the efficiency of 
related markets. 
Past literature shows that while a total lack of transparency is not desirable, full transparency 
may deter traders from acquiring information and dissuade informed market participants from 
trading (see, among others, Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Pagano and Röell, 1996; and Naik et 
al., 1999). The results from the empirical literature in this area tend to support the conjecture 
that greater transparency helps improve market liquidity: see, for example, Bessembinder et 
al. (2006), Edwards et al. (2007), and Goldstein et al. (2007) for the effect of TRACE (Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine) introduction on corporate bond transaction costs.  
More closely related to our paper is Loon and Zhong (2014), who show that voluntary central 
clearing of single-name CDS is associated with greater market liquidity. Loon and Zhong 
(2016) further find that liquidity improves in the index CDS market following the public 
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dissemination of real-time trade reports mandated by the DFA reforms. Pereira Da Silva et al. 
(2018) argue that central clearing enhances the overall quality of the CDS market. Improved 
liquidity and quality of the market could be attributed to greater post-trade transparency 
reducing the threat of informed trading to dealers. Our paper complements this literature, as it 
provides evidence consistent with a decline in informed trading in the single-name CDS 
market, after the start of DTCC disclosure and ICECC voluntary central clearing. To the 
extent that informed trading plays an important role in incorporating information into prices, 
requiring greater transparency could hinder the price discovery process in the CDS market, 
which seems likely if informed traders who previously traded in the CDS market are now 
choosing to trade more opaque products such as CDS options.
3
  
We develop our research hypotheses in Section 2 and explain the data and methodologies 
used to test them in Sections 3 to 6. In Appendix A, we review the reforms and the changes in 
market structure and information disclosure for single-name CDS, introduced in the US since 
2008. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
In the aftermath of the GFC, well before the DFA started being implemented and the SEC 
final rules were published in 2015, the introduction of the DTCC data disclosure and the 
ICECC central clearing sent a clear signal to informed investors that the single-name CDS 
market was about to change: more transparency would be introduced to achieve better 
monitoring and reduce the likelihood of financial instability and market abuses. Overall, 
financial institutions have voiced significant concerns over the development of CDS 
                                                          
3 It is possible that informed trading in the single-name CDS market has already started migrating to CDS options. As the 
Financial Times reports, the trading in CDS index option “has increased dramatically in recent years partly because – unlike 
credit default swaps themselves – the instruments are not required to be centrally cleared under new rules aimed at 
preventing a rerun of the financial crisis, according to traders” (Alloway, 2014). In 2014, an average of $60 billion of CDS 
index options were exchanged per week – up from about $2 billion traded per month back in 2005, according to data from 
the DTCC. Currently, no CDS option can be centrally cleared because of the difficulty of calculating margin requirements 
on these products. 
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transparency reforms and the optimal amount of “regulatory” and “market” post-trade 
transparency for CDSs. Some bank-dealers and their industry association, the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), argued that while regulatory reporting is a 
powerful tool, public reporting could harm the market if the disclosed information triggered 
speculative trading and market instability. The SEC also warned that a regulator’s inability to 
protect the confidentiality of the data could decrease the profits realized by informed traders 
and hinder the price discovery role of CDSs.  
Since October 31, 2008, the DTCC’s Trade Information Warehouse (henceforth, DTCC-TIW) 
has disseminated trade-level information about single-name CDS transactions to regulators 
and weekly aggregate information for the most popular contracts to market participants. We 
argue that the DTCC-TIW offers both “regulatory” and “market” transparency. In terms of 
“regulatory” transparency, SEC can examine transaction information on single-name CDSs 
traded by US counterparties or written on a US reference entity at any time, although these 
data are updated only weekly. In terms of “market” transparency, the DTCC discloses the 
weekly aggregate gross notional and the aggregate net notional amounts outstanding, as well 
as the number of CDS contracts on reference entities for the top 1,000 reference entities on its 
website. So far, the DTCC-TIW serves as a baseline for CDS regulatory and market 
transparency, which may lower informed trading because the disclosure may reduce the 
information advantage of informed traders and increase the likelihood that any illegal insider 
trading is detected. Therefore, we expect a lower level of informed trading in the single-name 
CDS market after the reporting of transactions began in the DTCC-TIW.  
In addition, ICECC central clearing, which began in December 2009, improves upon the 
baseline DTCC-TIW market transparency by disclosing single-name CDS trading activities 
(of each cleared reference entity) available at a higher (daily) frequency. Moreover, it 
improves upon the baseline regulatory transparency by giving regulators close to a real-time 
7 
 
access to full information on cleared single-name CDS trades. In other words, while the 
DTCC-TIW publishes single-name CDS open positions and trading activity only on a weekly 
basis and for top-reference entities, ICECC publishes data on all its cleared contracts at a 
daily frequency. Appendix A provides a more detailed summary of the DTCC-TIW reporting 
and ICECC central clearing. We expect that these improvements in post-trade transparency 
would further reduce the presence of informed trading in the CDS market. 
Thus, we state the main hypothesis of our paper as follows: 
H1: The higher transparency introduced by the post-crisis reforms (i.e., the start of trade 
reporting and disclosure by the DTCC and the introduction of voluntary central clearing by 
ICECC) reduces the level of informed trading in the CDS market. 
We test this hypothesis by looking at two important implications.  
Stock market analysts and investors are attuned to the CDS market as an alternative source of 
information, particularly one that is efficient in anticipating bad news about individual firms. 
The literature has provided a good deal of evidence on this. Acharya and Johnson (2007) 
show that CDS spread changes can predict stock returns, but are more sensitive to bad than to 
good news. Zhang and Zhang (2013), Batta et al. (2016) and Kryzanowski et al. (2017) find 
that the CDS market efficiently anticipates negative earnings surprises. Norden (2017) also 
observes that the CDS market quickly and accurately incorporates public and private 
information prior to negative rating events.
4
  
                                                          
4 In addition, Norden and Weber (2004) document the early reaction of the CDS market to announcements of credit rating 
downgrades. Ni and Pan (2011) find that CDS premium changes can predict stock returns up to a few days, and the pattern 
of predictability is driven mostly by firms that experience adverse shocks in the CDS market. Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2014) 
find significant information flow from the CDS market to the stock and options markets for high-yield firms. Marsh and 
Wagner (2015) show that stocks lead CDS in incorporating general macro news, while CDS premium impound firm-specific 
bad news before stock prices do. Lee, Naranjo, and Sirmans (2014) and Marra (2017) find that the CDS market contains 
incremental information relative to the stock market with spillover effects, respectively, from CDS to stock return 
momentum, and from CDS to stock bid-ask spreads. Bai et al. (2017) find that the introduction of CDS enhances the amount 
of firm-specific information impounded in stock prices by examining the relation between CDS trading and stock return 
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Therefore, we test the following sub-hypotheses: 
H1a: By reducing informed trading, higher transparency in the CDS market decreases the 
flow of bad news into the stock market.  
H1b: By reducing informed trading, higher transparency in the CDS market decreases the 
magnitude of bad news contained in CDS spreads.  
 
3. Data and proxy of CDS price informativeness 
Our main source of CDS pricing data is Markit. We study a large sample of five-year CDS 
contracts written on 744 US reference entities over the sample period of January 2001 to 
December 2013.
5
 In Table 1, we report the dates when voluntary central clearing on ICECC 
began for a subset of these reference entities. The total number of CDS contracts cleared by 
ICECC at the end of 2013 is 159. Table 1 provides further information on the reference 
entities, their sectors, and both the announcement and implementation dates of central 
clearing. While these contracts have a mixture of centrally cleared (on a voluntary basis) and 
bilaterally settled transactions after their central clearing start dates, the remaining contracts 
have exclusively bilateral transactions throughout the sample period.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
synchronicity. Lee, Naranjo, and Velioglu (2018) find that CDS returns predict stock returns, particularly their idiosyncratic 
component, and that the jumps appearing in CDS premium around rating events also significantly predict stock returns.  
5 This is essentially the Batta et al. (2016) CDS sample extended from 2010 to the end of 2013. Since we use the CDS 
premium to perform time-series regressions, we maintain the requirement that firms in our sample must have at least 252 
daily observations of the five-year CDS premium. 
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Table 1 ICECC central-clearing dates and centrally-cleared CDS contracts 
Event date  













American Electric Power Co., Constellation 
Energy Group, Dominion Resources 
3 
11/01/2010 3 
FirstEnergy, Progress Energy, Sempra 
Energy 
6 
01/02/2010 2 AT&T, Verizon Communications 8 
15/02/2010 14 
Arrow Electronics, Caterpillar, CSX Corp., 
Deere & Co., Goodrich Corp., Honeywell 
International, Ingersoll-Rand Co., Lockheed 
Martin Corp., Norfolk Southern Corp., 
Northrop Grumman Corp., RR Donnelley & 
Sons Co., Raytheon Co., The Sherwin-
Williams Co., Union Pacific Corp. 
22 
08/03/2010 9 
Altria Group, Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 
Devon Energy, Duke Energy Carolinas, 
Halliburton Co., Newell Rubbermaid, Toll 
Brothers, Valero Energy, Whirlpool Corp. 
31 
29/03/2010 15 
AutoZone, CBS Corp., Comcast Corp., Cox 
Communications, Darden Restaurants, News 
America, Nordstrom, Safeway, Southwest 
Airlines Co., Target Corp., The Home Depot, 
The Kroger Co., The Walt Disney Co., Time 
Warner, Wal-Mart Stores  
46 
19/04/2010 9 
Alcoa, Computer Sciences Corp., E. I. du 
Pont de Nemours and Co., Eastman 
Chemical Co., Hewlett-Packard Co., IBM 
Co., International Paper Co., The Dow 
Chemical Co., Xerox Corp. 
55 
10/05/2010 13 
Aetna, American Express Co., Amgen, 
Baxter International, Boeing Capital Corp., 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Capital One Bank 
(USA), National Association, Cardinal 
Health, CIGNA Corp., General Electric 
Capital Corp., Marsh & McLennan Co., 
National Rural Utilities Cooperative Finance 
Corp., Simon Property Group 
68 
07/06/2010 1 Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF) 69 
06/07/2010 1 CenturyLink 70 
09/08/2010 10 
Campbell Soup Co., Canadian Natural 
Resources, Conagra Foods, Conocophillips, 
Fortune Brands, General Mills, Johnson 
Controls, Kraft Foods, Sara Lee, The Black 
& Decker Corp. 
80 
30/08/2010 8 
CVS Caremark Corp., Kohl’s Corp., Lowe’s 
Companies, McDonald’s Corp., McKesson 





28/02/2011 1 Motorola Solutions 89 
28/03/2011 10 
Barrick Gold Corp., Carnival Corp., Cisco 
Systems, Dell, Freeport-McMoRan Copper 
& Gold, MDC Holdings, Marriott 




ACE, Boston Properties Limited Partnership, 
ERP Operating Limited Partnership, GATX 
Corp., Loews Corp., MetLife, The Allstate 
Corp., The Chubb Corp., The Hartford Fin. 
Services Group, Vornado Realty 
109 
02/05/2011 8 
Avnet, Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, 
Pfizer, Quest Diagnostics, Ryder System, 




American International Group, Berkshire 
Hathaway, CA, Capital One Financial Corp., 
DIRECTV Holdings, Expedia, Pitney 




Boston Scientific, Heinz, Macy's, Nabors 
Industries 131 
09/10/2012 5 
HCP, Lincoln National Corp., Prologis, 
Prudential Fin., The Travelers Companies 136 
22/10/2012 6 
Apache Corp., Chevron Corp., Encana Corp., 




Kimco Realty Corp., Nucor Corp., Pacific 
Gas and Electric Co., Starwood Hotels & 
Resorts, Textron Fin. Corp., Textron Inc., 
The Procter & Gamble Co., The Williams 
Companies, VF Corp. 
151 
30/09/2013 8 
Avon Products, Block Financial, Caterpillar 
Financial and Services Corp., Ford Motor 
Co., Genworth Holdings, MeadWestvaco 
Corp., The Boeing Co., The Gap 
159 
 
By examining reference entities with information disclosed by the DTCC-TIW on CDS 
outstanding notional and the number of traded contracts, we observe a gradual move towards 
central clearing. From 2010 onwards, the total cleared CDS notional amount increased from 
$82 billion to $128 billion in 2011, $135 billion in 2012, and then decreased slightly to $122 
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billion in 2013. The total notional of bilaterally traded CDS contracts decreased from $215 
billion in 2010 to $145 billion in 2011, $105 billion in 2012, and $72 billion in 2013. The 
total number of traded contracts that are centrally cleared increased from about 165,000 in 
2010 to 257,000 in 2011, 281,000 in 2012, and then decreased to 248,000 in 2013. The 
number of traded contracts that are bilaterally settled also decreased gradually (434,000 in 
2010, 316,000 in 2011, 283,000 in 2012, and 203,000 in 2013). 
As in Acharya and Johnson (2007), the variable used to capture independent news arriving in 
the CDS market that is not yet incorporated into the stock market at the time is defined as the 
CDS innovation. To estimate this CDS innovation, we first construct the daily CDS return as 
the difference in the logarithm of the CDS premium over two consecutive days. We retrieve 
the daily stock returns for these firms from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
For each firm i, we run a time-series regression of the firm’s CDS return on a constant, five 
lags of the CDS return, the firm’s contemporaneous stock return and its five lags, as well as 
the product of these stock returns with the firm’s inverse CDS premium: 
 
   
   
5
,, ,  
1
5
, , ,, ,
0
CDS Ret CDS Ret
/ CDS Premium Stock Re .t
i i ji t i t j
j












   (1) 
We then define the CDS innovation (𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑖,𝑡) as the estimated residual ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 from the above 
time-series regression.
 
CDSInn captures news specific to the CDS market and measures the 
magnitude of the departure of actual CDS returns from the expected returns estimated from 
equation (1), or the “surprise component” of CDS returns.6 We create two CDS innovation 
series. The first is the positive part of CDSInn (CDSInn
+
). When CDSInn is negative, this 
                                                          
6 The dependence of the stock return coefficients on the inverse of the CDS level in equation (1) is designed to capture the 
nonlinear relation between the credit spread and the stock return in the classical Merton (1974) model (see Acharya and 
Johnson (2007), p. 120).  
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variable is set equal to zero. The second is the negative part of CDSInn (CDSInn
–
). When 
CDSInn is positive, this variable is set equal to zero. Positive CDS innovation, CDSInn
+
, 
indicates an unexpected increase in the CDS premium: fresh negative information about the 
firm is uniquely incorporated into its CDS premium before being impounded into its stock 
price.7  
We report the summary statistics of the positive and negative parts of daily CDS innovations 
in Table 2.  
  
                                                          
7 Both CDS and equity can be viewed as derivatives written on the firm value. Therefore, they are likely to be affected by the 
same set of market risk factors. However, given that we regress CDS returns on contemporaneous and lagged stock returns 
in equation (1), the CDS residuals should not be correlated with these market risk factors. For example, we calculate the 
correlation between each firm’s CDS innovation and the change in the VIX at the daily frequency and then derive the mean 
(median) of the correlations across all firms in the sample. As expected, the average (median) correlation across all firms is 
only 0.0296 (0.0294). We also calculate the correlation between each firm’s CDS innovation and the changes in the 1-year, 
5-year, and 10-year constant maturity Treasury yields at the daily frequency. The mean (median) correlations across all firms 
in the sample are very low: −0.0423 (-0.0325), −0.0423 (-0.0419), and −0.0467 (−0.0474), respectively. These figures 
reinforce the notion that the CDS innovations incorporate firm-specific news, rather than common market-wide shocks. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics  




 are the positive and negative 
parts of CDS innovation (winsorized at the top and bottom 1%, respectively) and are expressed in percentages. 
CDS innovation is calculated as the residuals from the time-series regression equation (1). CDS Premium is the 
daily composite five-year CDS premium in basis points. CDS Return is calculated as the difference in the 
logarithm of the CDS premium over two consecutive days; then it is annualized by multiplying by 252. Daily 
Stock Return is directly retrieved from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP); it is then annualized 
by multiplying by 252. Ln(Notional Value) is the natural logarithm of the average weekly net notional value of 
open CDS positions (in billions of US dollars). Ln(Contracts Outstanding) is the natural logarithm of the average 
weekly number of CDS contracts outstanding (in thousands). CDS Market Depth is the average daily number of 
quote providers for the five-year CDS contract. Ln(Assets) measures firm size and is defined as the logarithm of 
the firm’s quarterly total assets (in millions of US dollars). Leverage is defined as long-term debt plus debt in 
current liabilities, divided by the sum of these two variables and the market value of equity. Stock Return 
Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns from the previous quarter. Credit Rating is 
the firm’s S&P credit rating converted into a numerical scale (AAA=1, AA+=2, …, C=21, and D=22). 
Investment Grade is a dummy variable that equals one if the reference entity has an average credit rating of BBB 
or better, and zero otherwise. Number of Analysts is defined as the number of analysts covering the firm’s stock 
and it is obtained from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Current Ratio is the current assets 
divided by current liabilities. Tangible Ratio is plant, property, and equipment divided by total assets. The 
sample period is from 2001 to 2013. 







 (%) 0.795 0.307 0.000 0.000 0.741 
CDSInn
–
 (%) –0.806 0.166 –0.847 –0.020 0.000 
CDS Premium (bps) 195.471 450.738 44.486 89.734 196.544 
Daily CDS Return (%) 0.018 11.143 –1.532 0.000 1.102 
Daily Stock Return (%) –0.001 7.773 –2.513 0.058 2.654 
Ln(Notional Value) 20.390 0.715 19.871 20.416 20.896 
Ln(Contracts Outstanding) 7.348 0.662 6.927 7.422 7.830 
CDS Market Depth 6.122 4.348 3.000 5.000 8.000 
Ln(Assets) 9.371 1.315 8.429 9.251 10.130 
Leverage Ratio 0.506 1.592 0.308 0.452 0.609 
Stock Return Volatility 0.023 0.021 0.013 0.018 0.026 
Credit Rating 8.896 3.083 7.000 9.000 10.000 
Investment Grade 0.741 0.438 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Number of Analysts 13.824 7.620 8.000 13.000 19.000 
Current Ratio 1.582 0.941 0.996 1.362 1.878 





4. Impact of DTCC disclosure and central clearing on CDS-to-stocks information flow 
When a CDS contract does not trade frequently, its premium can be “noisy” and some portion 
of the estimated CDS innovation may reflect this noise rather than unique information 
(Gehde-Trapp et al., 2015). In other words, arbitrage forces would normally tie down CDS 
premiums to stock prices, but when there are few liquidity providers in the CDS market, 
arbitrageurs cannot step in to eliminate the mispricing and the noise component of the CDS 
spread could persist. If the CDS innovations were exclusively attributed to noise, illiquidity, 
and mispricing, then they should not be able to predict future stock returns because they do 
not contain any material information.  
However, the past literature discussed in Section 2 argues that the CDS market is particularly 
efficient in anticipating bad news specific to the firm. Accordingly, we should observe that 
positive CDS innovations (CDSInn
+
) are able to predict stock returns when bad news arrives.  
In this section, we ascertain whether positive CDS innovations do contain “unique” 
information,
8
 particularly ahead of negative events, and whether the flow of information from 
the CDS market to the stock market declines after the DTCC disclosure and central clearing 
introductions. This finding would suggest that the two post-crisis transparency reforms may 
have reduced informed trading in the CDS market.  
Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Qiu and Yu (2012) show that the impact of past CDS 
innovations on stock returns is greater when firms have bad forward-looking credit 
conditions. Their effect on stock returns should be negative and it should become even more 
negative when they interact with the credit condition dummies. To this end, we create three 
                                                          
8 We run some preliminary plausibility checks on the private information content of CDSInn+ by looking at the correlations 
between CDSInn+ and three measures that should also capture firm-specific private information: the idiosyncratic risk priced 
in stock returns and analysts’ forecast dispersion and forecast error of the firm’s earnings per share (using data from 
I/B/E/S). If CDSInn+ contains private information, then we should expect these correlations to be significantly positive. We 
find that all three variables are positively correlated with CDSInn+. The Pearson, Kendall and Spearmen correlations are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level and their values span from 13% to 53%. These results are unreported for brevity but 
they are available upon request. 
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credit condition dummies based on the future behavior of the CDS premium. CrDummyA is 
equal to one if the firm experiences a one-day increase in the CDS premium greater than 50 
basis points within the next 5, 30, or 90 days. 9  CrDummyB is equal to one if the firm 
experiences a one-day increase in the CDS premium greater than four standard deviations 
above the mean daily change within the next 5, 30, or 90 days (also used by Berndt and 
Ostrovnaya, 2014). Finally, CrDummyC is equal to one when the CDS premium remains at a 
level greater than 100 basis points within the next 5, 30, or 90 days. 
The additional and original hypotheses we test here are that the effect of past CDS 
innovations on current stock returns is more concentrated on their positive parts and, more 
importantly, that this effect is mitigated when the CDS market becomes more transparent – 
due to the reduction of informed trading.  
 
4.1. Impact of DTCC disclosure on CDS-to-stocks information flow 
We create an AfterDTCC dummy equal to one for all the days after October 31, 2008, as the 
DTCC began disseminating CDS transaction information on that date. Following Acharya and 
Johnson (2007), our regression specification uses five lags of the stock return (Stock Ret) and 






Stock Reti,t = α + ∑ [(βj
C+ + γj
C+CrDummyi,t + δj





C−AfterDTCCi,t) × CDSInni,t−j 




EAfterDTCCi,t) × Stock Reti,t−j] +  εi,t.      (2) 
                                                          
9 Acharya and Johnson (2007) use a similar dummy; however, they define it to be equal to one for all days in the sample 
period prior to each credit event. Qiu and Yu (2012) suggest that when the sample period is long, it is preferable to limit the 
period to 5, 30, or 90 days before each credit event. In our case, the sample period can be up to 12 years long for some firms. 





𝑗=1   represents the unconditional flow of bad news from the CDS market to the 
stock market, and ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝐶+5
𝑗=1  represents the conditional flow of bad news (i.e., given an 
impending credit event). Both forms of information flow have been analyzed by Acharya and 
Johnson (2007) and Qiu and Yu (2012), albeit not distinguishing between positive and 
negative CDS innovations. Based on the existing literature, we expect to find ∑ (𝛽𝑗
𝐶+ +5𝑗=1
𝛾𝑗
𝐶+) < 0 with high statistical and economic significance. Meanwhile, we do not expect to see 
significant ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝐶−5
𝑗=1  or ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝐶−5
𝑗=1  because CDS market participants are mostly focused on bad 
news about the firm. Finally, our additional contribution is to show whether ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝐶+5
𝑗=1 > 0: 
that is, the information advantage of CDS over stocks decreases (i.e., the impact of CDSInn
+
 
becomes less negative) after the DTCC’s post-trade reporting drives some informed investors 
away from the single-name CDS market. 
We estimate equation (2) as a pooled OLS regression using daily data, with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the firm level, over the sample period of 
2001–2013 with all CDS contracts. Each regression has nine cases, depending on which credit 
dummy is used (A, B, or C) and the length of the pre-credit event window (5, 30, or 90 days). 
We report the results for regression equation (2) in Table 3.  
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Table 3 Information flow from the CDS market to the stock market after DTCC starts disclosing CDS trading data (Eq. (2)) 
This table presents the results of the pooled regression Eq. (2) of daily stock returns on lagged positive and negative CDS innovations (obtained from Markit 
CDS data using Eq. (1)) and lagged stock returns, as follows: 
Stock Reti,t = α + ∑ [(βj
C+ + γj
C+CrDummyi,t + δj




j=1 + ∑ [(βj
C− + γj
C−CrDummyi,t + δj








EAfterDTCCi,t) × Stock Reti,t−j] + εi,t  
where the credit condition dummies are defined in three different ways: (A) the dummy is equal to one if the firm experiences a one-day increase in the CDS 
premium greater than 50 basis points within the next 5, 30, or 90 days; (B) the dummy is equal to one if the firm experiences a one-day increase in the CDS 
premium greater than four standard deviations above the mean daily change within the next 5, 30, or 90 days; (C) the dummy is equal to one if the CDS 
premium of the firm remains at a level greater than 100 basis points within the next 5, 30, or 90 days. The sample includes 744 CDS contracts (both cleared 
and non-cleared) and it goes from 2001 to 2013 (total observations: 1,171,853). Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering within firms are in 
parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 Specification A Specification B Specification C 
5 days 30 days 90 days 5 days 30 days 90 days 5 days 30 days 90 days 
∑βj
C+ 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.001 −0.006 −0.004 −0.004 
 (0.44) (0.27) (0.11) (0.58) (0.80) (0.23) (2.47) (1.76) (1.70) 
∑βj
C− −0.013*** −0.007*** −0.006*** −0.013*** −0.016*** −0.016*** −0.002 −0.003 −0.003 
 (4.38) (2.82) (2.35) (4.53) (5.45) (5.30) (1.00) (1.14) (1.09) 
∑γj
C+ −0.112*** −0.070*** −0.041*** −0.122*** −0.065*** −0.035*** −0.021*** −0.023*** −0.031*** 
 (4.35) (5.74) (3.79) (4.00) (5.83) (4.25) (3.64) (3.78) (5.57) 
∑γj
C− 0.008 −0.008 0.001 0.017 0.026*** 0.026*** −0.005 −0.008 −0.011** 
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 (0.55) (0.91) (0.08) (1.17) (2.80) (4.63) (1.03) (1.42) (1.97) 
∑δj
C+ 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.082*** 0.087*** 0.091*** 
 (9.28) (10.42) (9.41) (9.03) (10.29) (9.61) (10.87) (11.64) (12.81) 
∑δj
C− 0.011* 0.011* 0.009 0.012* 0.012* 0.010 0.010 0.011* 0.013** 
 (1.73) (1.79) (1.45) (1.78) (1.71) (1.55) (1.53) (1.66) (2.06) 
∑βj
E −0.079*** −0.084*** −0.084*** −0.074*** −0.060*** −0.047*** −0.091*** −0.091*** −0.093*** 
 (8.95) (8.97) (8.46) (8.20) (6.11) (4.46) (12.23) (12.00) (13.28) 
∑γj
E 0.108*** 0.078*** 0.064*** 0.153*** 0.001 −0.030** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.046*** 
 (4.34) (4.63) (4.11) (4.70) (0.05) (2.15) (3.25) (3.34) (4.12) 
∑δj
E −0.027* −0.025* −0.025* −0.023 −0.021 −0.023 −0.028** −0.029** −0.032** 
 (1.88) (1.75) (1.75) (1.56) (1.48) (1.63) (1.97) (2.01) (2.48) 
Constant <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 
 (7.17) (10.58) (11.10) (7.47) (7.66) (8.32) (11.82) (11.20) (10.65) 






In all cases, we find that ∑ (𝛽𝑗
𝐶+ + 𝛾𝑗
𝐶+)5𝑗=1 < 0  and ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝐶+5
𝑗=1 > 0.  In other words, past 
CDSInn
+
 has a negative and significant effect on current stock returns ahead of credit events. 
However, this negative effect is mitigated after the disclosure of CDS transaction data.  
Take Specification A with a five-day pre-credit event period, for instance. Before the DTCC 
disclosure date, we find that ∑ (𝛽𝑗
𝐶+ + 𝛾𝑗
𝐶+) = −0.1115𝑗=1 , which represents an 11.1 percent 
transmission of information from past positive CDS innovations to current stock returns 
during the five days prior to the credit event. This figure is higher than the finding of 6.5 
percent documented by Qiu and Yu (2012). One possible explanation is that we are looking 
only at the impact of CDSInn
+
, while the impact of CDSInn
–
 is conceivably weaker. A further 
explanation is that our sample period extends beyond 2008, including the whole GFC period 
and the subsequent recession, when more credit events have occurred for a larger number of 
firms. As in Qiu and Yu (2012), we consistently find that the magnitude of ∑ (𝛽𝑗
𝐶+ + 𝛾𝑗
𝐶+)5𝑗=1  
is higher when the pre-event window is shorter, since informed trading is more likely to occur 
when the credit event is getting closer.  
After the DTCC disclosure date, however, we find that the information transmission from 




𝐶+) = −0.035𝑗=1 , which is much smaller in size compared to before the 
DTCC disclosure date. This pattern holds across the board for the other specifications as well. 
It seems that the negative impact of CDSInn
+
 on future stock returns is diminished or 
completely reversed after the DTCC data disclosure started. 
As expected, we do not find significant information content in negative CDS innovations. 
Only ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝐶−5
𝑗=1  has a significantly negative coefficient in Specifications A and B, but it is 
economically less relevant (around 1% information transmission). This is consistent with the 
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literature that attributes CDS price discovery to the ability of CDSs to quickly impound firm-
specific negative information.  
 
4.2. Impact of central clearing on CDS-to-stocks information flow 
Next, we create an AfterClearing dummy equal to one for all the days after the 
commencement of central clearing by ICECC for each centrally cleared CDS contract. We 
estimate the following pooled OLS regression at the daily frequency, with heteroskedasticity-




Stock Reti,t = 
α + ∑ [(βj
C+ + γj
C+CrDummyi,t + δj
C+AfterClearingi,t) × CDSInni,t−j 




C−AfterClearingi,t) × CDSInni,t−j 






EAfterClearingi,t) × Stock Reti,t−j]  (3)
11
       
Our main hypothesis is ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝐶+5
𝑗=1 > 0; that is, we expect the information flow from positive 
CDS innovations to stocks to diminish after the commencement of central clearing.  
The pooled regression equation (3) has nine cases, depending on which credit dummy is used 
(A, B, or C) and on the length of the pre-credit event window (5, 30, or 90 days). We report 
the results for regression equation (3) in Table 4. For Specifications A and B, we find that 
∑ (𝛽𝑗
𝐶+ + 𝛾𝑗
𝐶+)5𝑗=1 < 0  and ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝐶+5
𝑗=1 > 0. 12  In other words, CDSInn
+
 has a negative and 
                                                          
10 Note that we have also estimated the pooled regressions (3) and (4) using only the cleared CDS contracts. The results 
remain qualitatively similar. 
11 We have tried to estimate equations (1), (2), and (3) using three lags instead of five. Results are very similar. 
12 For Specification C, we find that ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝐶+5
𝑗=1 < 0 and ∑ 𝛿𝑗
𝐶+5
𝑗=1 > 0, but the estimated coefficients ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝐶+5
𝑗=1  are lower in 
absolute value. We think it is because the credit-dummy used in Specification C (CDS spread being consistently higher than 
100 bps) does not indicate a sudden increase in CDS spreads. 
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significant effect on future stock returns ahead of credit events. However, this negative effect 
is mitigated after the introduction of central clearing.  
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Table 4 Information flow from the CDS market to the stock market after ICECC central clearing commencement (Eq. (3)) 
This table presents the results of the pooled regression Eq. (3) of daily stock returns on lagged positive and negative CDS innovations (obtained from Markit CDS data using 
Eq. (1)) and lagged stock returns as follows: 
Stock Reti,t = α + ∑ [(βj
C+ + γj
C+CrDummyi,t + δj




j=1 + ∑ [(βj
C− + γj
C−CrDummyi,t + δj








EAfterClearingi,t) × Stock Reti,t−j]
5
j=1 + εi,t  
where the credit condition dummies are defined in three different ways: (A) the dummy is equal to one if the firm experiences a one-day increase in the CDS premium greater 
than 50 basis points within the next 5, 30, or 90 days; (B) the dummy is equal to one if the firm experiences a one-day increase in the CDS premium greater than four standard 
deviations above the mean daily change within the next 5, 30, or 90 days; (C) the dummy is equal to one if the CDS premium of the firm remains at a level greater than 100 
basis points within the next 5, 30, or 90 days. The sample includes 744 CDS contracts (both cleared and non-cleared) and it goes from 2001 to 2013 (total observations: 
1,171,853). Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering within firms are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively.  
 Specification A Specification B Specification C 
5 days 30 days 90 days 5 days 30 days 90 days 5 days 30 days 90 days 
∑βj
C+ 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.006** 0.009*** 0.011*** 
 (7.59) (7.56) (8.03) (6.98) (7.01) (7.05) (2.44) (3.21) (3.65) 
∑βj
C− −0.009*** −0.003 −0.003 −0.010*** −0.013*** −0.013*** 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (3.33) (1.52) (1.28) (3.36) (4.31) (4.25) (0.16) (0.27) (0.47) 
∑γj
C+ −0.106*** −0.065*** −0.041*** −0.122*** −0.061*** −0.036*** −0.004 −0.008 −0.013** 
 (4.66) (5.92) (5.18) (4.34) (5.83) (5.76) (0.92) (1.62) (2.39) 
∑γj
C− 0.011 −0.007 <0.000 0.019 0.028*** 0.026*** −0.005 −0.008 −0.010* 




C+ 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 
 (6.48) (6.55) (6.65) (8.10) (8.40) (7.79) (8.14) (8.29) (8.37) 
∑δj
C− 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.045*** 
 (5.30) (4.94) (4.96) (5.64) (5.93) (5.58) (5.14) (5.50) (6.25) 
∑βj
E −0.091*** −0.095*** −0.096*** −0.084*** −0.069*** −0.057*** −0.098*** −0.099*** −0.102*** 
 (10.66) (12.18) (11.52) (10.08) (7.81) (6.14) (14.56) (14.95) (16.38) 
∑γj
E 0.105*** 0.077*** 0.064*** 0.151*** 0.002 −0.029** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.040*** 
 (4.26) (4.63) (4.12) (4.70) (0.11) (2.08) (2.79) (2.81) (3.54) 
∑δj
E −0.005 −0.002 −0.003 −0.016 −0.026* −0.034** −0.016 −0.016 −0.020 
 (0.37) (0.12) (0.19) (1.22) (1.94) (2.47) (1.32) (1.28) (1.57) 
Constant <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 
 (10.19) (13.36) (14.29) (10.23) (10.72) (11.44) (13.89) (12.98) (11.82) 






Take Specification A with a five-day pre-credit event period, for instance. Before the 
initiation date of central clearing, we find that ∑ (𝛽𝑗
𝐶+ + 𝛾𝑗
𝐶+) = −0.0855𝑗=1 , which represents 
an 8.5 percent transmission of information from positive CDS innovation to future stock 
returns during the five days prior to the credit event. After the introduction of central clearing, 
however, we find that the information transmission from CDS to stocks is drastically curtailed. 




−0.037, which is smaller in size compared to before the initiation date of central clearing. 
This pattern holds across the board for the other specifications as well. It seems that the 
introduction of central clearing reduces the negative impact of CDSInn
+
 on future stock 
returns. 
Once again, we do not find significant information content in negative CDS innovations. 
∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝐶−5
𝑗=1  has a significantly negative coefficient only in Specification B, but it is 
economically less relevant (around 1% information transmission).  
In summary, the results presented here are consistent with the following: i) there is 
information transmission from the CDS market to the stock market ahead of credit events; ii) 
CDS innovations do not solely represent noise, but only positive CDS innovations incorporate 
firm-specific negative information that is transmitted to the stock market; iii) the negative 
impact of positive CDS innovations on the stock market has weakened after an increase in 





5. Impact of DTCC disclosure and central clearing on positive CDS innovations 
In this section, we examine the direct impact of DTCC disclosure and the introduction of 
central clearing on the magnitude of the positive CDS innovation (CDSInn
+
), which 
represents our closest proxy of CDS informativeness. We start by using panel regressions and 
an event dummy to investigate the effect of the DTCC post-trade disclosure on CDSInn
+
. 
Next, we repeat this analysis to examine the effect of ICECC central clearing and add 
propensity-score matching to provide more robust results.  
5.1. Impact of DTCC disclosure on positive CDS innovations 
Our hypothesis is that the post-trade reporting to the DTCC-TIW and the disclosure of single-
name CDS transaction data to the regulators and the public (started on October 31, 2008) may 
reduce the information asymmetry in the CDS market, hence the size of the positive CDS 
innovations. We test this hypothesis by performing a panel regression on CDSInn
+
 with 
quarterly observations, using as the main variable of interest a dummy DTCC, which is equal 
to one after October 31, 2008, and zero otherwise. The impact of this dummy on CDSInn
+
 
should be negative.  
We also control for a list of CDSs and reference entity characteristics that have been shown 
to be related to the level of liquidity and information asymmetry, such as the CDS market 
depth (measured by the average daily number of quote providers for each CDS contract) and 
the reference entity’s size, leverage, credit rating, and stock return volatility, as well as the 
number of analysts following the firm’s stock. In addition, we control for firm and time 
(quarterly) fixed effects. The time fixed effects exclude the quarter related to the DTCC event 
in order not to subsume the DTCC dummy. The control for time fixed effects is very 
important as they should capture the effects of the GFC (Q1-2008, Q2-2008, Q3-2008, Q1-
2009, and Q2-2009). 
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In our first regression, we perform the analysis on the whole sample of reference entities. In 
this way, we examine the changes in CDSInn
+ 
around October 31, 2008 for all firms, and not 
only those included in the DTCC public disclosure. The reason for this is that even if a 
reference entity is not covered by the DTCC public dataset (as it did not enter the top 1,000), 
the relevant CDS transaction information for this reference entity may still be reported to the 
DTCC and then passed on to the regulators. It is not only the public disclosure of weekly 
aggregate information (i.e., market transparency), but also the ability of the regulators to see 
trade-level information (i.e., regulatory transparency) that can reduce informed trading and 
CDSInn
+
. Table 5 shows that the DTCC dummy has a negative and significant impact on 
CDSInn
+
. In Column (1), we see that holding everything else constant, there is a drop in 
CDSInn
+ 
of 62 bps. Taking into account the average value of CDSInn
+ 
of 80 bps, this 
decrease is economically quite significant. When we restrict the sample to firms that are 
covered by the DTCC weekly public disclosure of trading information, Column (2) shows 
that the drop in CDSInn
+ 




Table 5 Effect of DTCC post-trade disclosure on CDSInn
+
: Panel regressions with whole sample 
vs. DTCC covered sample 
This table presents the results from the panel regressions of CDSInn
+
 on a dummy for the quarters in which 
DTCC has published weekly CDS trading data and on a set of control variables, using the whole sample of 
reference entities and the DTCC-covered sample (i.e. only those firms that are included in DTCC public 
disclosure), respectively. The dependent variable is the quarterly average of daily positive CDS innovations for 
each reference entity. The independent variable of interest is DTCC, which equals one if the date is October 31, 
2008 or after; and zero otherwise. All control variables are from the previous quarter. The positive CDS 
innovation variable is winsorized at the upper 1% tail of the distribution to ensure that the result is not affected 
by a few outliers. Coefficients on all explanatory variables are multiplied by 10
2
. We control for quarter 
dummies (time fixed effects) and for firm fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics adjusted for 
clustering within firms are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 
 Positive CDS Innovations (CDSInn
+
) 
 Whole Sample DTCC-Covered Sample 
Specification (1) (2) 
DTCC −0.616*** −2.286*** 
 (−18.08) (−49.55) 
CDS Market Depth −0.022*** −0.021*** 
 (−9.63) (−10.09) 
Ln(Assets) 0.022 0.038 
 (0.94) (1.60) 
Leverage −0.005 0.003 
 (−0.77) (0.46) 
Credit Rating −0.009* −0.005 
 (−1.78) (−0.94) 
Stock Return Volatility 6.465*** 5.709*** 
 (9.99) (10.28) 
Number of Analysts <0.001 −0.004** 
 (0.05) (−2.05) 
Observations 16,339 9,985 
R-squared 0.453 0.536 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects 
(except the DTCC-






Table 5 also shows that a lower CDS market depth, a higher stock return volatility, and a 
smaller number of analysts following the stock are associated with an increase in positive 
CDS innovations. CDS market depth is a measure of liquidity and the other two potentially 




First, they suggest that the higher CDS liquidity generated by the DTCC reporting is not the 
only reason for a decrease in positive CDS innovations. If that were the case, we should have 
seen a significant and negative coefficient for CDS market depth and an insignificant 
coefficient for the DTCC dummy. Our result is, however, consistent with Loon and Zhong 
(2016), who find improving liquidity in the index CDS market following the public 
dissemination of real-time trade reports mandated by the DFA reforms.  
Second, higher stock return volatility and a smaller number of analysts following the stock 
are associated with an increase in CDSInn
+
. As these measures are widely used in the 
literature to capture information asymmetry (see, amongst others, Thomas, 2002; Piotroski 
and Roulstone, 2004; Chan and Hameed, 2006; Crawford et al., 2012), this suggests that 
CDSInn
+
 is indeed a valid measure of information asymmetry. 
The DTCC event occurred on a single date (October 31, 2008) for all CDS reference entities. 
Since this first analysis lacks the possibility of using a “control group”, we now expand it by 
looking at the introduction of ICECC central clearing, which represents a further 
improvement on the baseline DTCC regulatory and market transparency. This allows us to 
adopt a more sophisticated methodology to study the effect of higher transparency on CDS 
innovations. 
 
5.2. Impact of central clearing on positive CDS innovations 
We now conduct an analysis of the impact of central clearing commencement on the CDS 
contracts that have been cleared on ICECC over the sample period of 2009 to 2013. Our thesis 
is that the introduction of central clearing, through a more timely post-trade disclosure of 
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information, further reduces informed trading and hence the size of the positive CDS 
innovation relative to the post-DTCC baseline. 
5.2.1. Differences-in-differences (DID) 
Following the empirical methodology of Batta et al. (2016), we use the standard differences-
in-differences (DID) estimation in a panel data setting with quarterly observations controlling 
for firm and (quarterly) time fixed effects. In Table 6, CDSInn
+
 is regressed on a clearing 
dummy (ClearDummy), which is equal to one if reference entity i is centrally cleared by 
ICECC by quarter t, and zero otherwise. For non-cleared firms, the clearing dummy is always 
zero since they never experience central clearing during our sample period. Moreover, central 
clearing was introduced at different times for different firms. Thus, both the non-cleared firms 
and the subset of cleared firms that did not experience clearing introduction in a given quarter 
serve as the “control firms” in the DID estimation. This research design should already 
alleviate the concern that the “treatment firms” (i.e., the cleared firms) and the “control firms” 
are systematically different. The coefficient of the clearing dummy constitutes a double 
difference (i.e., the difference of CDSInn
+ 
before and after clearing for cleared vs. non-cleared 
firms), and we expect this coefficient to have a negative sign.  
Importantly, we restrict the sample to only those firms that had public disclosure of trading 
information on the DTCC website. In this setting, we test for the impact of central clearing 
(introduced between 2009 and 2013) as incremental to the impact of the DTCC data 
disclosure (introduced in October 2008). This also allows us to include additional controls for 
CDS liquidity (besides the number of quote providers from Markit) available from the DTCC 
disclosure, such as the net notional value of open CDS positions and the number of CDS 
contracts outstanding.  
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Our estimate of the effect of central clearing could be biased if ICECC’s selection of CDS 
contracts for clearing anticipates their level of price informativeness. However, we do not 
believe this to be the case. Based on the new client onboarding procedure posted by ICECC,
13
 
a new client who wants to clear a CDS contract would first need to establish a relationship 
with one of the ICE CDS clearing members. A reference entity is selected for clearing when 
there is a large demand for trading its CDS contracts from the participating clearing members. 
According to Loon and Zhong (2014), ICECC considers liquidity and open interest as the key 
criteria in selecting CDS for central clearing.
14
 
As in Table 5, we include a group of CDS liquidity and credit risk variables in the regressions. 
These variables help to control for cross-sectional differences among firms with and without 
central clearing. Lastly, we include firm fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneities at the firm level, as well as quarterly fixed effects to control for common time 
trends. 
Table 6 shows that the clearing dummy has a negative and significant impact. After central 
clearing begins, the positive CDS innovation decreases by around 7 bps in both Specification 
(1) and Specification (2), which includes more control variables. Table 6 also shows that 
CDSInn
+
 is larger among firms with higher stock return volatility and lower CDS market 
depth. 
  
                                                          
13 https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_credit/ICE_Clear_Credit_Client_Clearing_Overview.pdf. 
14 Our later results from a probit estimation (Table 7) also confirm that CDS reference entities with higher open interest and 
investment-grade ratings are more likely to be chosen by ICECC for central clearing. 
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Table 6 Effect of central clearing commencement on CDSInn
+
: Difference-in-difference 
This table presents the results from the panel regressions of CDSInn
+
 on a dummy for the quarters in which a 
CDS entity has been centrally cleared (ClearDummy) and on a set of control variables, using the whole sample 
of reference entities. The dependent variable is the quarterly average of daily positive CDS innovations for each 
reference entity. The independent variable of interest is ClearDummy, which equals one if a reference entity is 
centrally cleared by ICECC by quarter t; and zero otherwise. All control variables are from the previous quarter. 
The positive CDS innovation is winsorized at the upper 1% tail of the distribution to ensure that the result is not 
affected by a few outliers. Coefficients on all explanatory variables are multiplied by 10
2
. Heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering within firms are reported in parentheses. We control for quarter 
dummies (time fixed effects) and for firm fixed effects. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated 
by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 





ClearDummy −0.072*** −0.073** 
 
(−2.82) (−2.55) 




































Observations 5,908 4,116 
R-squared 0.563 0.648 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes 







5.2.2. Propensity score matching  
Next, in order to explicitly address any systematic difference between cleared and non-cleared 
entities, we use propensity score matching (PSM) to identify “control entities”. These are 
firms with a similar likelihood of experiencing central clearing introduction as the actual 
cleared firms but that have not yet been cleared in a given quarter t or that have never 
experienced central clearing during our sample period. To find these matching firms, we first 
estimate a probit model that predicts the probability of a firm’s CDSs to be cleared by ICECC 
during the next quarter, using covariates measured in the current quarter. We then perform the 
same panel regression in Table 6 using various matched samples.  
The probit model is fitted to a sample of both cleared and non-cleared firms. Most of the 
independent variables we use are the same as those included in the probit model of Loon and 
Zhong (2014).
15
 They fall into four categories related to the extent of “public interest” in the 
CDS contract and the reference entity: liquidity, default risk, industry affiliation, and 
asymmetric/public information. In Specification (1), we use only the variables related to CDS 
liquidity: the number of quote providers for the five-year CDS contract, the net notional value 
of open CDS positions, and the number of outstanding CDS contracts. In Specification (2), we 
add credit rating and firm financial ratios to measure default risk. Investment grade is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the obligor has an average rating of BBB or better. The 
firm financial ratios included are the leverage ratio, the current ratio, and the tangibility ratio. 
We also include the squared leverage ratio to allow for a nonlinear effect of financial leverage 
on default. In Specification (3), we include additional controls: firm size, stock volatility, and 
                                                          
15 Loon and Zhong (2014) estimate their probit model for central clearing (which happens after December 2009) using 
independent variables measured at the beginning of 2009. Their matching procedure is also based on propensity scores 
computed using the same 2009 data. In contrast, our probit model is estimated using panel data, where we predict the 
likelihood of central clearing in a given quarter using covariates measured during the preceding quarter. Moreover, for firms 
experiencing central clearing in a given quarter, our “matching firms” are identified using propensity scores computed 
during the previous quarter among all non-cleared firms as well as cleared firms that begin central clearing in a later quarter. 
Since our sample period for central clearing extends from 2009 to 2013, our matching algorithm should work better than 
matching based solely on 2009 measurements.  
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the number of analysts following the firm’s stock. Table 7 reports the estimates of the probit 
model. Consistent with Loon and Zhong (2014), the results suggest that CDS reference 
entities with larger open interest and higher credit ratings are more likely to be selected by 
ICECC for central clearing. Also, firms with a higher number of analysts are more likely to be 
selected for central clearing as there is more “public interest” in them. 
Table 7 Probability of central clearing (probit model) 
This table reports the results from a probit model that predicts the initiation of central clearing by ICECC. The 
probit model is estimated using panel data, where we predict the likelihood of central clearing in a given quarter 
using covariates measured during the preceding quarter. The dependent variable in the probit models is 
ClearDummy, which equals zero before the reference entity is centrally cleared, one at the quarter of centrally 
clearing initiation, and missing value after that (to ensure each treated firm is matched only once). Leverage 
Ratio
2
 is the square of leverage. Industry dummies are constructed using the Markit industry classifications. All 
control variables are from the previous consecutive quarter (they have been defined at Table 2). N is the number 
of firms in the sample. The number of companies that have available data on CDS Market Depth and also 
Ln(Notional Value) for the whole sample is 297. Among those 297 observations, there are 132 centrally-cleared 
CDS firms and 165 non-cleared CDS firms. Numbers in parentheses are standard error adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 ClearDummy =1 if centrally cleared, 0 otherwise 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CDS Market Depth 0.032 0.089 0.066 
 (0.56) (1.10) (0.71) 
Ln(Notional Value) 0.705*** 0.627*** 0.948*** 
 (4.66) (3.00) (3.74) 
Ln(Contracts Outstanding) 0.116 0.686*** 0.480* 
 (0.70) (3.04) (1.75) 
Investment Grade  1.866*** 1.888*** 
  (5.94) (4.81) 
Leverage Ratio  2.206 2.307 
  (1.59) (1.34) 
Leverage Ratio
2  −1.613 −1.989 
  (−1.31) (−1.25) 
Current Ratio  −0.001 −0.125 
  (−0.01) (−1.45) 
Tangible Ratio  0.404 −0.0179 
  (1.15) (−0.05) 
Ln(Assets)   −0.253*** 
   (−4.92) 
Stock Volatility   −0.752 
   (−0.10) 
Number of Analyst   0.032*** 
   (2.77) 
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Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,106 1,518 1,262 
Pseudo R
2
 0.186 0.370 0.434 
 
Next, for each cleared entity, we identify the single nearest neighbor (NN1) or the two nearest 
neighbors (NN2) in terms of propensity scores from the group of non-cleared entities and 
cleared entities that begin central clearing in a later quarter. The inclusion of the latter group 
improves the matching performance because they are more similar to the “treated” entities. 
We obtain the propensity scores from the estimates of the probit model. We also select for 
each cleared entity the firms with less than a one-percent difference (within 1%) and five-
percent difference (within 5%) in terms of propensity score from the group of non-cleared 
entities and cleared entities that begin central clearing in a later quarter. When we find a 
matching firm, we include its entire time-series of observations (with replacement) in the 
matched sample. By design, this propensity-score matching allows us to construct a sample of 
non-cleared firms that have pre-clearing characteristics relevant for central clearing, similar to 
the cleared firms. 
In Specifications (1) to (4) in Table 8, we repeat the same panel regression analysis presented 
in Table 6 using the PSM samples. Specifications (1) and (2) use the NN1 and NN2 samples, 
respectively. Specifications (3) and (4) use as matches the firms whose propensity scores are 
within one or five percent of that of the cleared entity. In all of these specifications except 
one, the clearing dummy has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, and the size of 
this coefficient is very similar to the one in Table 6, which is estimated using the original 




Table 8 Effect of central clearing commencement on CDSInn
+
: Propensity score matching based 
on the score from probit model in Table 7 
This table presents the results from the panel regressions of CDSInn
+
 on a dummy for the quarters in which a 
CDS entity has been centrally cleared (ClearDummy) and on a set of control variables, using the propensity-
score matched samples. The propensity scores are calculated using the probit estimates in Table 7, Specification 
(3). We use four different criteria for matching: NN1 (only 1 closest match), NN2 (two closest matches), Within 
1% (within 1% difference in the propensity score), and Within 5% (within 5% difference in the propensity 
score). The dependent variable is the quarterly average of daily positive CDS innovations for each reference 
entity. The independent variable of interest is ClearDummy, which equals one if a reference entity is centrally 
cleared by ICECC by quarter t; and zero otherwise. All control variables are from the previous quarter. The 
positive CDS innovation variable is winsorized at the upper 1% tail of the distribution to ensure that the result is 
not affected by a few outliers. Coefficients on all explanatory variables are multiplied by 10
2
. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering within firms are reported in parentheses. We control 
for quarter dummies (time fixed effects) and firm fixed effects. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is 
indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 














ClearDummy −0.063* −0.053* −0.070 −0.071* 
 
(−1.86) (−1.81) (−1.38) (−1.76) 
Ln(Notional Value) 0.140 0.103 0.155* 0.107 
 
(1.59) (1.31) (1.84) (1.32) 
Ln(Contracts Outstanding) −0.153 −0.120 0.124 0.016 
 
(−1.29) (−1.10) (0.82) (0.14) 
CDS Market Depth −0.006 −0.014 −0.013 0.000 
 
(−0.32) (−0.71) (−0.68) (0.02) 
Ln(Assets) −0.043 0.024 −0.055 −0.076 
 
(−0.42) (0.25) (−0.55) (−0.76) 
Leverage 0.296** 0.263** 0.238 0.185 
 
(2.39) (2.01) (1.60) (1.61) 
Credit Rating 0.011 0.004 0.024 0.010 
 
(0.48) (0.14) (0.88) (0.38) 
Stock Return Volatility 2.122 2.976* 2.553** 2.492** 
 
(1.33) (1.82) (2.28) (2.13) 
Number of Analysts 0.005 0.009 0.008 0.006 
 
(0.84) (1.61) (1.31) (1.21) 
 
    
Observations 3,490 5,448 1,046 3,902 
R-squared 0.665 0.669 0.671 0.655 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 






In unreported results, we also employ a Heckman two-step model (Heckman, 1979) to control 
for sample selection bias. In the first stage, we calculate the inverse Mills’ ratio (Lambda) 
from the probit model that estimates the probability for a firm to have a centrally-cleared CDS 
contract (we use for this purpose the model reported at Table 7, column 3). In the second 
stage, we include Lambda as a covariate in our panel regression along with ClearDummy (and 
the other controls). In this regression we use all firms, both those with cleared and with 
uncleared CDS contracts. We observe that the coefficients of ClearDummy remain negative 
and also statistically significant at the 1% level after controlling for the inverse Mills’ ratio 
(Lambda). After central clearing begins, the positive CDS innovation decreases by around 10 
bps. 
 
6. Robustness checks 
6.1. Changes in CDS–stock market integration 
Two different interpretations of the results presented can still be entertained. The first is our 
maintained Hypothesis H1 – that they are consistent with a reduction of informed trading in 
the CDS market. Another possibility is that the weakening of the lead-lag effect from the CDS 
market to the stock market may indicate a more immediate transmission of information 
between CDS and stock markets, once there is greater transparency in the CDS market.  
Therefore, to provide further support to our argument that the diminished lead-lag effect from 
CDSs to stocks is due to less unique information in the CDS market, in this section we 
examine changes in CDS–stock market integration around central clearing and trade reporting 
events. We check the integration level between the CDS and the stock market for each firm by 
computing the correlation between stock returns (daily percentage changes) and CDS returns 
37 
 
(daily spread changes), and we then evaluate changes in this correlation after the start of 
central clearing and DTCC reporting. To provide more robustness to the correlation measure, 
we use three different measures of “association” between daily CDS spread changes and daily 
stock returns: Pearson, Spearman, and Kendall. Pearson’s correlation measures the degree of 
linear association between daily stock returns and CDS spread changes. Spearman’s and 
Kendall’s measure how well the relationship between the two variables can be described 
using a monotonic function, without requiring the function to be linear. Kapadia and Pu (2012) 
also use Kendall’s correlation to measure the CDS–stock market integration.  
We expect all of the correlations to have a negative sign. We interpret a more negative 
correlation as a sign of higher cross-market integration. Using t-tests, we check whether there 
is a statistically significant increase in correlation after the introduction of ICECC central 
clearing and DTCC trade reporting. We compare the mean (median) correlation in a pre-event 
period with the mean (median) correlation during the event period.  
The results of the t-tests for the central clearing introduction are reported in Table 9. We use 
the same event window as that selected by Loon and Zhong (2014) in their similar analysis of 
the impact of central clearing commencement (event date) on CDS counterparty risk. The 
event period goes from the event date to 20 days after in order to account for possible delayed 
reactions from traders. The pre-event period goes from 250 to 21 days before the event date. 
Table 9 shows no significant changes in correlations before and during the event. We also 
adopt binomial tests to assess whether the proportion of reference firms which experience any 
increase in correlations (negative “differences”) differs significantly from a random 50% 
proportion. The results suggest that about 50% of the sample firms experience an increase in 
CDS–stock market integration, and as expected, the test never rejects the null hypothesis that 
it is just a random 50% proportion. We also use an alternative event period [0, 30 days] and 
pre-event period [−250 days, −31 days], finding similar results. 
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Table 9 Changes in CDS–stock market integration before and after the start of central clearing: 
t-tests 
The table reports an analysis of changes in CDS-market integration around central clearing commencement by 
comparing Pearson’s, Spearman’s, and Kendall’s correlations between daily stock returns and CDS premium 
changes in the ‘Pre-event’ period and ‘Event’ period. Following Loon and Zhong (2014), we use as event-period 
[0, 20] to account for possible delayed impact of central clearing. The pre-event period goes instead from day 
−250 to −21 days from the event. For each reference entity, ‘Pre-event' (‘Event’) is the average or median CDS–
stock correlation in the pre-event (event) period. For each reference entity ‘Difference’ is calculated as Event 
minus Pre-event. Cross-sectional mean (median) of ‘Pre-event’, ‘Event’, and ‘Difference’ are reported. Note 
that the cross-sectional mean (median) difference does not come equal to the cross-sectional mean (median) 
‘Event’ minus the mean (median) ‘Pre-event’ due to the unbalanced nature of our panel dataset and the presence 
of some missing data in the pre-event and event periods. t-Tests verify whether the cross-sectional mean 
(median) of ‘Difference’ is not significantly different from zero. PctNeg is the percentage of firms with negative 
‘difference’ in CDS–stock correlations and P(PctNeg =50%) is the p-value under the null that PctNeg is a 
random 50%. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Change in Correlations between CDS premium changes and Stock returns  
 
Pre-Clearing [−250, −21]  
vs. Clearing Event [0, 20] 
Pearson 
Pre-Clearing [−250, −21]  
vs. Clearing Event [0, 20] 
Spearman 
Pre-Clearing [−250, −21]  
vs. Clearing Event [0, 20] 
Kendall 
Cross-sectional Mean: 
Pre-event −0.238 −0.225 −0.155 
Event −0.248 −0.231 −0.165 
Difference −0.013 −0.016 −0.005 
Cross-sectional Median: 
Pre-event −0.263 −0.231 −0.155 
Event −0.238 −0.257 −0.200 
Difference 0.036 −0.005 −0.009 
Binomial Test:  
PctNeg (percent) 46.67% 51.11% 48.15% 
P(PctNeg =50%) 0.4913 0.8634 0.7308 
 
 
The results of the t-tests around the DTCC trade reporting event of October 31, 2008 are 
illustrated in Table 10.  
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Table 10 Changes in CDS–stock market integration before and after the start of DTCC trade 
reporting: t-tests 
The table reports an analysis of changes in CDS–market integration around DTCC trade reporting 
commencement by comparing Pearson’s, Spearman’s, and Kendall’s correlations between daily stock returns 
and CDS premium changes in the ‘Pre-event’ period and ‘Event’ period. Following Loon and Zhong (2014), we 
use as event-period [0, 20] to account for possible delayed impact of trade reporting. The pre-event period goes 
from day −250 to −21 days from the event (31 October 2008). For each reference entity, ‘Pre-event' (‘Event’) is 
the average or median CDS–stock correlation in the pre-event (event) period. For each reference entity 
‘Difference’ is calculated as Event minus Pre-event. Cross-sectional mean (median) of ‘Pre-event’, ‘Event’, and 
‘Difference’ are reported. Note that the cross-sectional mean (median) difference does not come equal to the 
cross-sectional mean (median) ‘Event’ minus the mean (median) ‘Pre-event’ due to the unbalanced nature of our 
panel dataset and the presence of some missing data in the pre-event and event periods. t-Tests verify whether 
the cross-sectional mean (median) of ‘Difference' is significantly different from zero. PctNeg is the percentage 
of firms with negative ‘difference’ in CDS–stock correlations and P(PctNeg =50%) is the p-value under the null 
that PctNeg is a random 50%. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
Change in Correlations between CDS premium changes and Stock returns 
 
Pre-DTCC [-250, -21]  
vs. DTCC [0, 20] 
Pearson 
Pre-DTCC [-250, -21]  
vs. DTCC [0, 20] 
Spearman 
Pre-DTCC [-250, -21]  
vs. DTCC [0, 20] 
Kendall 
Cross-sectional Mean: 
Pre-event −0.176 −0.158 −0.110 
Event −0.241 −0.217 −0.160 
Difference −0.046*** −0.042*** −0.039*** 
Cross-sectional Median: 
Pre-event −0.178 −0.156 −0.107 
Event −0.289 −0.253 −0.187 
Difference −0.063*** −0.065*** −0.060*** 
Binomial Test:  
PctNeg (percent) 58.58% 60.94% 60.04% 
P(PctNeg =50%) <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
Here, we observe a small but statistically significant increase in mean (median) CDS–stock 
market integration (that is, negative “differences”). However, this result requires a cautious 
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interpretation due to the particular period we are looking at (October and November 2008). 
The peak of the GFC effects could result in higher correlation across the markets due to more 
systematic risk, 16
 
rather than better information transmission. Since higher information 
transmission and better market integration depend on informed arbitrageurs’ trading ability, 
we rely on one of the results of Kapadia and Pu (2012) – namely, that firm-specific 
characteristics, in particular CDS liquidity, play a key role in determining informed 
arbitrageurs’ ability to arbitrage across stocks and CDSs. If the higher CDS–stock correlation 
over the DTCC reporting commencement period is due to higher information transmission, 
then we should also observe an improvement in CDS liquidity around that event: when there 
are more liquidity providers in the CDS market, arbitrageurs can step in to eliminate the 
mispricing, so that the CDS and stock markets align. If the higher correlation is due to more 
systematic risk, then we should observe instead a decline in CDS liquidity. Therefore, we 
repeat the t-tests using now CDS liquidity (measured by the number of CDS quote 
contributors) instead of CDS–stock market integration. Table 11 shows that there is a 
significant decrease in CDS liquidity around the DTCC event period.  
  
                                                          
16
 Kapadia and Pu (2012) show that a higher level of firms’ idiosyncratic risk is associated to lower CDS-equity 




Table 11 Changes in CDS liquidity before and after the start of DTCC trade reporting: t-tests 
The table reports an analysis of changes in CDS liquidity (measured by the number of quote contributors) 
around DTCC trade reporting commencement by comparing this variable in the ‘Pre-event’ period and ‘Event’ 
period. Following Loon and Zhong (2014), we use as event-period [0, 20] to account for possible delayed 
impact of trade reporting. The pre-event period goes from day −250 to −21 days from the event (31 October 
2008). For each reference entity, ‘Pre-event’ (‘Event’) is the average or median CDS liquidity in the pre-event 
(event) period. For each reference entity ‘Difference’ is calculated as Event minus Pre-event. Cross-sectional 
mean (median) of ‘Pre-event’, ‘Event’, and ‘Difference’ are reported. Note that the cross-sectional mean 
(median) difference does not come equal to the cross-sectional mean (median) ‘Pre-event’ minus the mean 
(median) ‘Event’ due to the unbalanced nature of our panel dataset and the presence of some missing data in the 
pre-event and event periods. t-Tests verify whether the cross-sectional mean (median) of ‘Difference’ is 
significantly different from zero. PctNeg is the percentage of firms with negative ‘difference’ in CDS liquidity 
and P(PctNeg =50%) is the p-value under the null that PctNeg is a random 50%. Significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
CDS Liquidity (Number of CDS-quote contributors for firms with trade data in DTCC) 









Binomial Test:  
PctNeg (percent) 95.67% 
P(PctNeg =50%) <0.0001 
 
In addition, Kapadia and Pu (2012) find that firms with higher leverage levels and equity 
volatility display more CDS-equity integration: this is consistent with the Merton’s model 
predicting that when a firm’s credit risk is higher there is a higher correlation between its 
stock returns and CDS spread changes. We therefore examine whether after the DTCC event 
there is a higher level of firms’ credit risk. To do so, we repeat the t-tests and analyze changes 
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in the firms’ CDS premiums. Table 12 presents the result of the t-tests and confirms that CDS 
premiums increase significantly after the DTCC event. Taken together, these results suggest 
that the increase in CDS–stock market integration after the DTCC event is due to higher 
systematic risk rather than better information transmission between the two markets. 
Table 12 Changes in CDS premiums before and after the start of DTCC trade reporting: t-tests 
The table reports an analysis of changes in CDS premiums around DTCC trade reporting commencement by 
comparing this variable in the ‘Pre-event’ period and ‘Event’ period. Following Loon and Zhong (2014), we use 
as event-period [0, 20] to account for possible delayed impact of trade reporting. The pre-event period goes from 
day −250 to −21 days from the event (31 October 2008). For each reference entity, ‘Pre-event’ (‘Event’) is the 
average or median CDS premium in the pre-event (event) period. For each reference entity ‘Difference’ is 
calculated as Event minus Pre-event. Cross-sectional mean (median) of ‘Pre-event’, ‘Event’, and ‘Difference’ 
are reported. Note that the cross-sectional mean (median) difference does not come equal to the cross-sectional 
mean (median) ‘Pre-event’ minus the mean (median) ‘Event’ due to the unbalanced nature of our panel dataset 
and the presence of some missing data in the pre-event and event periods. t-Tests verify whether the cross-
sectional mean (median) of ‘Difference’ is significantly different from zero. PctPos is the percentage of firms 
with positive ‘difference’ in CDS premium and P(PctPos =50%) is the p-value under the null that PctPos is a 
random 50%. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
CDS premium for firms with trade data in DTCC 









Binomial Test:  
PctPos (percent) 96.90% 





6.2 Concurrent changes in the CDS market  
In 2009, the CDS market witnessed a few more changes in addition to the introduction of 
voluntary central clearing for some reference entities. For example, in the same year, the CDS 
market in North America moved towards a standardization of contracts (the so-called Big 
Bang) in order to simplify the market and prepare it for central clearing.  
Since these changes are in part concurrent with the clearing events studied in Section 5, we 
repeat the analysis in that section using a “placebo test”: we randomly move the AfterClearing 
event dummies forward and backward by one or two quarters. 
In Tables 13 and 14, we see that all of the placebo tests fail: the placebo-event dummy has an 




Table 13 Effect of placebo-event dummy on CDSInn
+
: Dummy two-quarters backward and 
forward the ‘Clearing’ event 
This table presents the results from the panel regressions of CDSInn
+
 on a placebo event-dummy for two 
quarters before and after the one when a CDS entity has been centrally cleared (Placebo-Dummy) and on a set of 
control variables, using the whole sample of reference entities. The dependent variable is the quarterly average 
of daily positive CDS innovations for each reference entity. The independent variable of interest is Placebo-
Dummy, which equals one if a reference entity is centrally cleared by ICECC by: quarter t+2 (columns 1 and 2) 
or quarter t−2 (columns 3 and 4); and zero otherwise. All control variables are from the previous quarter t−1. 
The positive CDS innovation is winsorized at the upper 1% tail of the distribution to ensure that the result is not 
affected by a few outliers. Coefficients on all explanatory variables are multiplied by 10
2
. Heteroskedasticity-
robust t-statistics adjusted for clustering within firms are reported in parentheses. We control for quarter 
dummies (time fixed effects) and for firm fixed effects. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated 
by *, **, and ***, respectively. 





Clearing at t+2 
(2) 
Clearing at t+2 
(3) 
Clearing at t-2 
(4) 
Clearing at t-2 
Placebo-Dummy 0.053** 0.019 0.029 0.052 
 


















(−3.12) (−1.98) (−3.61) (−2.28) 
Ln(Assets) 
 
−0.022  −0.021 
  
(−0.34)  (−0.34) 
Leverage 
 
0.002  0.002 
  
(1.00)  (1.12) 
Credit Rating 
 
0.025  0.023 
  












(1.55)  (1.63) 
      
Observations 5,908 4,116 5,908 4,116 
R-squared 0.563 0.642 0.562 0.643 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered 
Standard Errors 




Table 14 Effect of placebo-event dummy on CDSInn
+
: Dummy one-quarter backward and 
forward the ‘Clearing’ event. 
This table presents the results from the panel regressions of CDSInn
+
 on a placebo event-dummy for one quarter 
before and after the one when a CDS entity has been centrally cleared (Placebo-Dummy) and on a set of control 
variables, using the whole sample of reference entities. The dependent variable is the quarterly average of daily 
positive CDS innovations for each reference entity. The independent variable of interest is Placebo-Dummy, 
which equals one if a reference entity is centrally cleared by ICECC by: quarter t+1 (columns 1 and 2) or quarter 
t−1 (columns 3 and 4); and zero otherwise. All control variables are from the previous quarter t−1. The positive 
CDS innovation is winsorized at the upper 1% tail of the distribution to ensure that the result is not affected by a 
few outliers. Coefficients on all explanatory variables are multiplied by 10
2
. Heteroskedasticity-robust t-
statistics adjusted for clustering within firms are reported in parentheses. We control for quarter dummies (time 
fixed effects) and for firm fixed effects. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. 





Clearing at t−1 
(2) 
Clearing at t−1 
(3) 
Clearing at t+1 
(4) 
Clearing at t+1 
Placebo-Dummy −0.010 −0.035 −0.044* −0.051 
 
(−0.35) (−1.00) (−1.67) (−1.63) 
Ln(Notional 
Value) 
−0.011 0.000 −0.015 −0.009 
 
(−0.29) (0.00) (−0.40) (−0.22) 
Ln(Contracts 
Outstanding) 
0.138** −0.006 0.140** 0.020 
 
(2.16) (−0.09) (2.30) (0.31) 
CDS Market 
Depth 
−0.031*** −0.025** −0.036*** −0.029** 
 
(−3.20) (−2.15) (−3.63) (−2.42) 
Ln(Assets)  −0.021  −0.035 
 
 (−0.31)  (−0.55) 
Leverage  0.002  0.002 
 
 (0.90)  (1.09) 
Credit Rating  0.024  0.022 
 
 (1.55)  (1.46) 
Stock Return 
Volatility 
 1.703**  1.823** 
 
 (2.31)  (2.56) 
Number of 
Analysts 
 0.005  0.006* 
 
 (1.56)  (1.80) 
      
Observations 5,908 4,116 5,908 4,116 
R-squared 0.564 0.645 0.564 0.647 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Quarter Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered 
Standard Errors 





In the aftermath of the GFC, there were significant changes in the single-name CDS market 
structure. Voluntary CDS post-trade reporting started and a major data repository, the DTCC-
TIW, began its public disclosure of weekly trading data on single-name CDSs. Later on, more 
CDS transactions moved towards central clearing on ICECC, which also began disclosing 
CDS positions data on a daily basis. At the same time, regulators gained more or less 
unfettered access to the trade-level data captured by these data repositories.  
In this paper, we examine whether the higher post-trade transparency after the GFC had any 
impact on the CDS price informativeness and the incremental price discovery function of the 
CDS market relative to the stock market. The analysis of information flows from CDS to 
stocks demonstrates that the positive CDS innovations do not just reflect “noise”, but 
information that is transmitted to the stock market ahead of credit events. However, the ability 
of these positive CDS innovations to predict future stock returns has weakened after the 
transparency reforms. The panel regression analysis, difference-in-differences (DID), and 
propensity score matching methods reveal a decrease in the positive CDS innovation, our 
proxy for information asymmetry, after the introduction of the DTCC disclosure and ICECC 
central clearing. 
Taken together, our results suggest that the single-name CDS market has become much less of 
a “hidden” trading venue for informed investors after the GFC. On the one hand, the increase 
in CDS market transparency may help assuage the problem of insider trading discussed by 
Acharya and Johnson (2007): in this case, the changes advocated by the DFA Title VII 
legislation, even before they are made compulsory by SEC regulation, go towards the desired 
direction of reducing market abuses. On the other hand, the higher transparency may deter 
traders from acquiring information and dissuade informed market participants from trading. 
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The loss of informed trading can hinder the price discovery role of the CDS market: this 
finding should be a concern for regulators who are advocating for even more transparency in 
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Appendix A: Post-trade transparency reforms in the US single-name CDS market  
All rules under Title VII of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act (DFA) for security-based swaps 
(including single-name credit default swaps (CDSs) are not yet fully implemented almost a 
decade after the global financial crisis (GFC). Only in February 2015 did the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) produce two final rules (SEC 34-74244 and SEC 34-74245) on 
the public dissemination of information on single-name CDSs, but these rules are not yet 
obligatory. Also, central clearing is not yet mandatory in the US for single-name CDSs under 
the SEC rules. 
Despite the sluggishness of the SEC in making Title VII of the DFA mandatory for single-
name CDSs, a voluntary practice of central clearing and trade reporting has already spread 
and developed. Intercontinental Exchange Clear Credit (ICECC) has been active since 2009 
as a clearinghouse for US single-name CDSs. Moreover, there are already four swap data 
repositories (SDRs) operating in the US: the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation 
(DTCC), Bloomberg, ICE Trade Vault, and the CME Group. Currently, the DTCC Trade 
Information Warehouse (DTCC-TIW) and ICECC also provide public information on single-
name CDS trades. Thus, while a complete and mandatory transparency regime of single-name 
CDS transactions in the US has not yet been implemented, a certain degree of transparency in 
the market has already been achieved. 
A.1. The Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation Trade Information Warehouse  
In a letter to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, dated October 31, 2008, the 16 major 
CDS dealers and industry associations committed to utilizing the DTCC-TIW as a “single, 





 Virtually all dealers and buy-side participants, along with 15 
third-party service providers, are already linked to the TIW and utilize its functionality. Thus, 
the vast majority of traded CDS contracts are reported to it. In addition, all of the major CDS 
dealers have registered in the TIW many of the contracts they executed before October 31, 
2008. This makes the DTCC-TIW the single dominant provider of record-keeping services for 
single-name CDSs in the US. 
Each recorded transaction in the DTCC-TIW contains the following information: the name of 
the reference entity; the trade date and the effective date; the (expected) maturity of the 
contract; the type of participating counterparties (dealer or end-user, and a finer classification 
of end-users as asset managers, banks, financial services, hedge funds, insurance companies, 
and “other”); and the executed notional amount. When anonymized, each counterparty is 
identified by a unique number that allows its positions to be tracked over time and across 
names. Each transaction is also specified as a new trade, an assignment of an existing trade, or 
a termination of an existing trade. The DTCC repository holds these details on the legal, or 
“gold,” record for both cleared and bilateral CDS transactions. The repository also stores key 
information on market participants’ single-sided, non-legally binding, or “copper” record for 
CDS transactions. 
Most regulators around the world (e.g., the SEC in the US) are connected to the DTCC-TIW 
and have access to its information within the scope of their jurisdictional influence. For 
example, the SEC can access transaction information on single-name CDSs traded by US 
counterparties or written on a US reference entity. Regulators can examine and download 
DTCC-TIW data at any time, but these data are not updated in real-time. In most cases, they 
                                                          
17 The banks and industry associations are: Bank of America, Barclays Capital, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Kleinwort, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Royal 
Bank of Scotland, Société Générale, UBS, and Wachovia, as well as the Managed Funds Association and the ISDA. Their 




can also see the identity of the counterparties for the reported transactions, again within the 
scope of their jurisdictional influence. So far, the DTCC-TIW is the main source of 
“regulatory” transparency. Nevertheless, regulators are now moving towards direct electronic 
access to the transaction data stored by other SDRs. 
Besides “regulatory” transparency, the DTCC also offers some degree of “market” 
transparency. For example, the repository publishes weekly reports on its website that 
summarize the current data on its gold record. This information consists of end-of-week 
aggregate data on the outstanding number of contracts and gross and net notional for the top 
1,000 reference entities. In addition, the DTCC publishes the weekly number of traded 
contracts and amount of traded gross notional that represent a transfer of credit risk among the 
market participants for the top 1,000 reference entities. The DTCC public disclosure of the 
first type of information (position data) began on October 31, 2008. The DTCC public 
disclosure of the second type of information (market risk activity) began on August 13, 2010. 
The DTCC updates this online information for the previous week every Tuesday after 17:00 
ET (22:00 GMT). The reporting “delay” is part of a confidentiality agreement between the 
DTCC and market participants in the single-name CDS market.  
A.2. Intercontinental Exchange Clear Credit  
In 2008, the hedge fund Citadel Group proposed to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) 
to set up a clearinghouse and an electronic trading system for CDS. The proposal quickly 
failed because of the opposition of major bank-dealers. The banks responded to Citadel’s 
initiative by collaborating with ICE US Trust, one of CME’s competitors, which was setting 
up its own clearinghouse. The banks attached a number of conditions to the partnership that 
gave them significant power at ICE’s clearinghouse, in particular by maintaining a majority at 
the ICE risk committee, which sets the fees, prices, and margin requirements, and 
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recommends which derivatives should be handled through the clearinghouse. Other favorable 
provisions to the banks were the restrictive membership rules that limited participation in the 
clearinghouse. Furthermore, in order to limit central clearing transparency, these founding 
banks required ICE to provide settlement price data exclusively to Markit, and to make them 
accessible to the public only after a fee payment (Norman, 2011, pp. 297–302). 
Intercontinental Exchange Clear Credit (ICECC) is the first and only clearinghouse that 
currently clears US single-name CDS. The Federal Reserve approved ICECC (initially 
launched as ICE US Trust) to clear single-name CDS on March 4, 2009 and it quickly took 
off: by March 2010, it had cleared more than $71 billion notional of CDS referencing 33 
single names (Norman, 2011, pp. 297–302). At the end of 2013, ICECC had accepted for 
clearing 159 US corporate reference entities. ICECC has also seen a growing number of CDS 
clearing memberships from institutional and buy-side investors.
18
 The SEC’s analysis of CDS 
trading activity from July 2012 to December 2013 indicates that, out of the $938 billion 
notional traded in North American corporate single-name CDS, $666 billion had 
characteristics making them suitable for clearing by ICECC. Approximately 79 percent of 
this, or $525 billion, was actually cleared through ICECC. The fraction of total gross notional 
amount of new trades and assignments in North American single-name CDSs that were 
accepted for clearing by ICECC and were cleared within 14 days of the initial transaction 
ranges between 50 percent and 70 percent over the period 2011–2013.
19
 Before accepting a 
new CDS contract for clearing, ICECC looks at its weekly open interest and trading volume 
                                                          
18 From January to May 2015, 12 firms were added to the 18 existing members. The list of clearing members can be found at 
https://www.theice.com/clear-credit/participants. “The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has approved an 
application by LCH's CDSClear unit for registration as a clearing agency. The authorisation, granted on December 29, 2016, 
allows LCH to begin clearing single-name credit default swap (CDS) contracts for US clients”. “Demand for ICE's services 
has been hampered by the SEC's failure to mandate clearing of single-name CDS contracts. However, 25 large asset 
managers committed to begin voluntarily clearing their single-name CDS trades in late 2015 – a development that helped 
boost clearing volumes at ICE in 2016” (Devasabai, 2017).  
19 See https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2015/34-74245.pdf (p. 129). 
56 
 
on the DTCC Trade Information Warehouse (DTCC-TIW) and consults with the clearing 
members regarding the eligibility of the contract for central clearing.  
Through its website, ICECC publicly disseminates end-of-day post-trade information on the 
open interest, volume, and number of transacted contracts for all single-name CDSs processed 
by its clearinghouse. Thus, while DTCC-TIW publishes single-name CDS open positions and 
trading activity only on a weekly basis and for top-reference entities, ICECC publishes data 
on all its cleared contracts at a daily frequency. These data can be accessed for free at 
https://www.theice.com/marketdata/reports/99, and they can help to track trading and clearing 
patterns in specific single-name CDSs, especially for high-volume trades, given that the daily 
number of transactions for each contract is relatively low.  
Under the DFA (even while the SEC implementation is not yet effective), ICECC is obligated 
to report all of its cleared trades to an SDR for regulatory monitoring and public 
dissemination.
20
 Currently, ICECC reports all of its cleared trades to ICE Trade Vault, the 
SDR of ICE, on an intra-daily basis. Any regulator can require full access to ICE Trade Vault 
within the scope of its jurisdiction. Swap data repository participants can access their own 
data and the data that ICE Trade Vault makes publicly available (which do not include the 
identity of the trading counterparties). Finally, public users can access the publicly disclosed 
portion of the data for free after registering for an account on ICE Trade Vault’s website.
21
 
The information provided, besides the time stamp, size, and price of each trade, also includes 
the nature of the trade, whether the trade is cleared (and subject to collateralization), and 
whether the trade involves a large block. The historical data we have downloaded from ICE 
Trade Vault for the period considered, however, show that the real-time CDS trade reports 
available to public users contain only CDS index trades and no single-name CDS trades. 
                                                          
20 The reporting to SDRs is already mandatory for cleared CDS index trades under the rules of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission. 
21
 The ICE Trade Vault data can be accessed at https://www.icetradevault.com/tvus-ticker/. 
